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Abstract
What is the optimal portfolio allocation when an agent is investing both for a firm and for himself? I
address this question by solving a manager’s decision problem under a specific executive compensation
structure. Specifically, I study how flat wage and stock compensation affect the manager’s investment
decision. I show that the allocation is the same regardless of whether the manager is prohibited from
trading the public shares of his own firm. Results from calibration show that the manager invests less
in firm-specific technology and more in the aggregate stock market as the risk of the firm’s project
increases. More stock compensation discourages him from investing in the firm’s risky technology,
but encourages more risk-taking in terms of personal investment. In addition, I prove that flat wage,
effectively as a riskless bond, hedges risk and leads to more risk-taking behavior both in firm investment
and personal investment.
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1 Introduction
Both the academic community and finance practitioners are interested in the problem of executive com-
pensation. What sort of incentive structure best aligns what the manager wants to do and what he should
do? In this paper I present a simple model that aims to tackle some aspects of this problem. Specifically, I
ask the question if the manager makes two decisions: investing for the firm and investing for himself, what
are the optimal portfolio holdings? I solve this portfolio choice problem in two distinct ways, and find the
following results. First, having separate budget constraints for the firm and the manager’s own wealth
or having one budget constraint for the whole problem does not change the manager’s optimal portfolio
choice. This result hinges on the fact that the manager can invest in the risk-free asset both as part of
the firm and as part of his own personal portfolio. Second, the optimal holdings in the firm’s technology
versus the aggregate market portfolio is sensitive to the capital shares. Specifically, if the firm’s capital
is a large portion of the total capital available for investment, the optimal number of shares invested in
the risky technology will be relatively steady over time. On the other hand, if the manager’s own wealth
is a large portion of the total capital available for investment, the optimal number of shares invested in
the aggregate market will be relatively constant through time. Third, the manager seeks to rebalance his
portfolio. If he started with 30 percent in the risky technology and 30 percent in the aggregate market,
and the market goes up while the risky technology stays still, he would want to sell some shares in the
aggregate market and buy some more in the risky asset to maintain 30 percent of the total wealth in
the risky technology and the aggregate market respectively. Lastly, as the flat wage the manager receives
increases, he would want to invest more in both the risky technology and the aggregate stock market.
The intuition is that the extra flat wage acts as an investment in some risk-free technology that makes
the portfolio safer. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 I introduce and set
up the model. In Sections 3 and 4 I solve the model in closed form in two distinct ways. In Section 5 I
present the main results from the model. In Section 6 I calibrate the model parameters. In Section 7 I
discuss some empirical predictions of the model. Section 8 concludes.
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2 Model Setup
Consider a firm with its manager in charge of the firm’s investment decision between time t ∈ [0, T ].
Meanwhile, the manager also invests his personal wealth within the same period. At any time between
[0, T ], the capital of the firm at time t, denoted asKt, could be allocated into the following two technologies:
1. A linear risky technology with the following instantaneous rate of return to investment:
dSt = µdt+ σdWt + σ1dWit (1)
where the Brownian motion (BM) dWt captures the aggregate risk and the BM dWit captures the
idiosyncratic risk associated with firm i.
2. A riskless storage technology with the real rate of return rdt.
To simplify analysis without much loss of generality, we assume that the firm only pays a liquidating
dividend at time T , equal to the accumulated capital KT . In other words, we assume the zero dividend
policy1 and that there is no fire sale at time T . Meanwhile, the manager’s personal wealth, denoted as
At, could be invested in either the aggregate stock market or a riskless asset:
1. The aggregate stock market is characterized by a total rate of return equal to:2
dSMt = µMdt+ σMdWt (2)
2. For ease of illustration, I assume the same real rate of return of the riskless asset as that of the
riskless storage technology, denoted as dβt = rdt.
As for the manager’s compensation, he is paid nothing before T , but is awarded n shares of his own firm at
time 0. In addition, he is promised a flat wage w at time T . Thus, the total compensation to the manager
at time T is w+nKT . In the next section, I allow the manager to trade the public shares of his own firm,
the case of which should give the allocation that maximizes the manager’s welfare. I solve this decision
1Imagine that the board is in charge of dividend payout.
2Note that I assume away all of the idiosyncratic risks in equilibrium.
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problem using the Martingale approach as a benchmark. Then, in Section 4, I prohibit the manager from
trading his own firm and study the distortion compared to the benchmark. I am particularly interested in
how the portfolio allocation distortion changes with the manager’s incentive structure, as described below.
3 Trading Own Firm Allowed
Assume that the manager’s utility is defined only on his final wealth. Specifically, I adopt the CRRA
utility specification. Thus, the manager’s problem is to choose how much the firm and he himself invest
in different assets to maximize his own time-0 expected utility:
max E0
[
e−ρT
(AT + w + nKT )
1−γ
1− γ
]
(3)
where ρ is the continuous-time discount rate and γ is the constant relative risk aversion, subject to the
following dynamic budget constraints:
θotPβt + θ
o
tAS
M
t = A0 +
ˆ t
0
θouPdβu + θ
o
uAdS
M
u (4)
θotFβt + θ
o
tKSt = K0 +
ˆ t
0
θouFdβu + θ
o
uKdSu (5)
θoTPβT + θ
o
TAS
M
T = AT (6)
θoTFβT + θ
o
TKST = KT (7)
where A0 and K0 are the given initial values (can treat as zeros), P denotes the shares invested in the
risk-free asset in the manager’s personal portfolio, F denotes the shares invested in the risk-free asset in
the firm’s portfolio, θotA is the shares invested in the aggregate stock market for the manager’s personal
portfolio, and θotK is the shares invested in the firm’s linear risky technology. (4) and (5) are the self-
financing conditions and (6) and (7) are the terminal values, where The (5) and (7) are imposed by the
firm’s technology, while (4) and (6) are imposed by the manager’s own investment opportunities. In the
most limited case, the manager is only able to invest in the aggregate stock market and the riskless asset.
Limiting the manager’s investment opportunity set in turn limits his maximized utility. If we allow the
manager to also invest in the firm without restrictions - he is able to take long or short positions of any
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size in the firm - we can combine the above budget constraints. Giving the manager a larger investment
opportunity set, I can look at the first-best optimal portfolio choice of the manager when he is least
constrained. Adding (4) to n × (5) and (6) to n × (7), and setting w = 0 in the original problem for
simplicity, the manager’s decision problem turns into:
max E0
[
e−ρT
(AT + nKT )
1−γ
1− γ
]
(8)
subject to
(θotP + nθ
o
tF )βt + θ
o
tAS
M
t + nθ
o
tKSt = (A0 + nK0) +
ˆ t
0
(θouP + nθ
o
uF )dβu + θ
o
uAdS
M
u + nθ
o
uKdSu(9)
(θoTP + nθ
o
TF )βT + θ
o
TAS
M
T + nθ
o
TKST = AT + nKT (10)
Note that the left hand side of (9) is effectively the wealth of the manager at time t, denoted as Wt ≡
(θotP + nθ
o
tF )βt + θ
o
tAS
M
t + nθ
o
tKSt, and I thus define the shares of wealth invested in the risky assets at
time t as ϑo, respectively:
ϑotA ≡
θotAS
M
t
Wt
and ϑotK ≡
nθotKSt
Wt
which are effectively the optimal portfolio weights for the manager - the key variables of interest in this
paper. Also, define the mean excess returns for the firm’s risky technology and the aggregate stock
market to be the vector λ ≡ [λA, λK ] ≡ [µM − r, µ− r]. Now, if I put the two BM’s into the vector
dBt ≡ [dWt, dWit], I can write the loadings on the BM’s as σ ≡
 σM 0
σ σ1
, and call the market price
of risk ν ≡ σ−1λ =
[
λA
σM
, σMλK−σλAσMσ1
]
. I solve (8) in Appendix A1 through simple change of measures and
obtain the main result of this section: the optimal portfolio weights of the total wealth invested in the
stock market and the risky technology for the manager is given by
ϑo ≡
 ϑotA
ϑotK
 = 1
γ
(σσ′)−1λ =
1
γ
 (σ2+σ21)λA−σMσλKσ2Mσ21−σMσλA+σ2MλK
σ2Mσ
2
1
 . (11)
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4 Trading Own Firm Prohibited
Now, I consider the case in which the manager is prohibited from trading the public shares of the firm he
works for. As before the manager’s utility is defined only on his total wealth, so his optimization problem
reads:
maxϑctA,ϑ
c
tK
E0
[
e−ρT
(AT + w + nKT )
1−γ
1− γ
]
(12)
s.t. dAt = (Atr +Atϑ
c
tAλA) dt+Atϑ
c
tAσMdWt (13)
dKt = (Ktr +Ktϑ
c
tKλK) dt+Ktϑ
c
tK (σdWt + σ1dWit) (14)
where ϑctA ≡ θ
c
tAS
M
t
At
denotes the fraction of the manager’s total personal wealth invested in the aggregate
stock market, ϑctK ≡ θ
c
tKSt
Kt
denotes the fraction of the firm’s capital invested in the risky technology, θctA
and θctK are the counterparts of θ
o
tA and θ
o
tK defined in the last section, and λA and λK are also defined
as before. The “c” superscripts distinguish this problem as a more constrained optimization compared to
the one before denoted by the superscripts “o” where the manager was allowed to trade on his own firm’s
public shares. Thus, I can write a Bellman equation as:
sup
ϑctA,ϑ
c
tK
D J (At,Kt, t) = 0 (15)
where
D J (At,Kt, t) = Jt + JA [At (r + ϑ
c
tAλA)] + JK [Kt (r + ϑ
c
tKλK)]
+
1
2
JAA
[
A2tϑ
c
tA
2σ2M
]
+
1
2
JKK
[
K2t ϑ
c
tK
2
(
σ2 + σ21
)]
+JAK [Atϑ
c
tAKtϑ
c
tKσMσ]
with boundary condition
J (AT ,KT , T ) =
(AT + w + nKT )
1−γ
1− γ (16)
I solve this Bellman equation in Appendix A2 and obtain the following optimal portfolio weights of the
total personal wealth invested in the stock market and of the firm’s capital invested in the risky technology
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for the manager:
ϑc ≡
 ϑctA
ϑctK
 =
 At+we−r(T−t)+nKtγAt
(
λA(σ2+σ21)
σ21σ
2
M
− λK
σ21
σ
σM
)
At+we−r(T−t)+nKt
γnKt
(
λK
σ21
− λA
σ21
σ
σM
)
 . (17)
5 Main Results
In this section I present the main results of the paper with some key comparative statics. When the
manager can trade his own firm’s public shares and thus has a larger investment opportunity set as in
Section 3, his optimal portfolio weights are:
ϑotA =
θotAS
M
t
Wt
=
1
γ
(
λA
σ21
σ2 + σ21
σ2M
− λK
σ21
σ
σM
)
≡ ϕa
ϑotK =
nθotKSt
Wt
=
1
γ
(
λK
σ21
− λA
σ21
σ
σM
)
≡ ϕk
where ϕk and ϕa need to be calibrated. When the manager cannot trade his own firm’s public shares and
thus has a constrained investment opportunity set as in Section 4, his optimal portfolio weights are:
ϑctA =
θctAS
M
t
At
=
Wt
At
θctAS
M
t
Wt
=
At + wt + nKt
At
1
γ
(
λA
σ21
σ2 + σ21
σ2M
− λK
σ21
σ
σM
)
=
Wt
At
ϕa
ϑctK =
θctKSt
Kt
=
Wt
nKt
nθctKSt
Wt
=
At + wt + nKt
nKt
1
γ
(
λK
σ21
− λA
σ21
σ
σM
)
=
Wt
nKt
ϕk
where Wt = At+wt+nKt and wt = we−r(T−t). Therefore, the two solutions are the same - they give the
same portfolio allocations of the manager’s total wealth Wt.3
Proposition 1. (Budget Equivalence) Separate budget constraints and combined budget constraints
yield the same solution to the manager’s optimization problem.
The intuition is simple: the concern for non-additivity comes from the possibility of violation of the self-
financing condition by taking short positions in either investments, but notice that in this setup we have
the same riskless investment technology for both the manager and the firm, then we can always add up
3This suggests that we can effectively add up the dynamic budget constraints of the two investment opportunities for the
manager’s problem.
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the budget constraints given that we can always hedge (take long/short positions) using the same riskless
asset respectively and still stay in the self-financing strategies.
Next, define the manager’s firm-investment share of wealth, private-investment share of wealth, and
discounted-wage share of wealth respectively as
sk,t ≡ nKt
Wt
, sa,t ≡ At
Wt
, and sw,t ≡ wt
Wt
Therefore, I can write the two optimal investment shares as: Fraction of Firm Capital in Linear Risky
Technology (the Benchmark, see Figure 1): ϑctK =
ϕk
sk,t
, or say the optimal risky investment share of firm
capital. Fraction of Personal Wealth in Aggregate Stock Market (the Benchmark, see Figure 2): ϑctA =
ϕa
sa,t
,
or say the optimal risky investment share of personal wealth.
Proposition 2. (Asymptotic Myopia) If the manager’s wealth from firm investment (nKt) is large
enough, the optimal risky investment share of firm capital will be relatively constant. On the other hand,
if the manager’s wealth from private investment (At) is large enough, then the optimal risky investment
share of personal wealth will be relatively constant.
To see this, notice that
ϑctK =
ϕk
sk,t
=
At + wt + nKt
nKt
ϕk
nKt→∞−→ ϕk and ϑctA =
ϕa
sa,t
=
At + wt + nKt
At
ϕa
At→∞−→ ϕa
When we look at the direct effect of wealth shares on optimal investments, we have
∂ϑctK
∂sk,t
= − ϕk
s2k,t
T 0 and ∂ϑ
c
tA
∂sa,t
= − ϕa
s2a,t
T 0
so the signs of ϕk and ϕa are crucial for the following key results.
For example, if ϕk > 0 and ϕa > 0, then it means that when the share of total wealth coming from firm
investment increases, the manager optimally chooses to reduce the investment of firm capital Kt in the
risky technology, meanwhile, when the share of total wealth coming from private investment increases, the
manager optimally chooses to reduce the investment of personal wealth At in the stock market. We notice
that when ϑctK =
ϕk
sk,t
S 0, then ∂ϑ
c
tK
∂sk,t
T 0, and when ϑctA =
ϕa
sa,t
S 0, then ∂ϑ
c
tA
∂sa,t
T 0. So, when the manager
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takes a long position in the risky investment for firm capital (ϑctK > 0), as the share of his total wealth
coming from firm investment increases (sk,t ↑), he reduces the risky investment for firm capital (ϑctK ↓).
On the other hand, when he takes a short position in the risky investment for firm capital (ϑctK < 0), as
the share of his total wealth coming from firm investment increases (sk,t ↑), he raises the risky investment
for firm capital (ϑctK ↑). Yet, in either case, the magnitude of the risky asset investment of firm capital
unambiguously decreases (|ϑctK | ↓). The same logic applies to the risky asset investment of personal wealth
(ϑctA). Thus, we have the following result.
Proposition 3. (Relative-wealth Rebalancing) Regardless of taking long or short positions, the man-
ager will reduce the magnitude (in absolute value) of firm capital investment in the risky technology, if
his firm-investment share of wealth increases. Similarly, he will reduce the magnitude of personal wealth
investment in the stock market, if his private-investment share of wealth increases.
Economically, since the manager has no control over the firm’s level of available capital Kt, the changes
in his share of wealth coming from firm investment effectively come from the variation in his executive
compensation scheme n. In empirical analysis below, I evaluate the relative-wealth rebalancing effect by
doing comparative statics of the optimal investment strategy with respect to n. Figures 3 and 4 numerically
confirm Proposition 3 by displaying uniformly downward shifts of the time-series of optimal weights as
the number of corporate shares awarded to the manager (n) increases. This is intuitive in the sense that
as the executive compensation gets larger, the incentive to pursue risky investments becomes less for the
manager. What would be interesting here is that when the firm’s risky investment technology is actually
the aggregate market portfolio (e.g. the firm is a mutual fund), and thus λK = λA and σ = σM , then we
would have ϑctK = 0, ϑ
c
tA =
1
sa,t
λA
γσ2M
and thus ∂ϑ
c
tK
∂sk,t
= 0, ∂ϑ
c
tA
∂sa,t
= − 1
s2a,t
λA
γσ2M
< 0. In this case, the manager’s
optimization problem collapses back to a typical power utility investor’s myopic portfolio choice and we
would obtain the standard investment rule.
Next, notice the effect of terminal flat wage on optimal investment shares:
∂ϑctK
∂w
=
∂ϑctK
∂sk,t
∂sk,t
∂wt
∂wt
∂w
=
ϕk
s2k,t
nKt
(At + wt + nKt)
2 e
−r(T−t) T 0
∂ϑctA
∂w
=
∂ϑctA
∂sa,t
∂sa,t
∂wt
∂wt
∂w
=
ϕa
s2a,t
At
(At + wt + nKt)
2 e
−r(T−t) T 0
9
which only depend on the signs of ϕk and ϕa. This is in similar spirit as Proposition 3. Note that when
ϑctK =
ϕk
sk,t
T 0, then ∂ϑ
c
tK
∂w T 0, and when ϑctA =
ϕa
sa,t
T 0, then ∂ϑ
c
tA
∂w T 0. So, when the manager takes
a long position in the risky investment for firm capital (ϑctK > 0), as the terminal wage increases (w ↑),
he raises the risky asset investment of firm capital (ϑctK ↑). On the other hand, when he takes a short
position in the risky investment for firm capital (ϑctK < 0), as the terminal wage increases (w ↑), he reduces
the risky asset investment of firm capital (ϑctK ↓). Yet, in either case, the magnitude of the risky asset
investment of firm capital unambiguously increases (|ϑctK | ↑). The same logic applies to the risky asset
investment of personal wealth (ϑctA). Thus, we have the following result.
Proposition 4. (Labor Income Hedging) A higher terminal flat wage increases the magnitudes (in
absolute values) of risky asset investments of both firm capital and personal wealth.
In empirical analysis below, I evaluate the labor income hedging effect by doing comparative statics of
the optimal investment strategy with respect to w. Figures 5 and 6 numerically confirm Proposition 4
by displaying uniformly upward shifts of the time-series of optimal weights as the terminal flat wage (w)
increases. This is intuitive in the sense that we can view the exogenous flat wage as an extra source of
riskless investment for the manager. Such an additional “risk-free bond” in the background provides an
extra hedging channel and the absolute shares in risky assets will therefore rise for both investments.
Corollary 1. A higher share of total wealth coming from the discounted flat wage increases the magnitudes
(in absolute values) of risky asset investments of both firm capital and personal wealth.
To see this, note that
∂ϑctK
∂sw,t
=
∂ϑctK
∂sk,t
∂sk,t
∂wt
1
∂sw,t
∂wt
=
ϕk
s2k,t
nKt
At + nKt
T 0 and ∂ϑ
c
tA
∂sw,t
=
∂ϑctA
∂sa,t
∂sa,t
∂wt
1
∂sw,t
∂wt
=
ϕa
s2a,t
At
At + nKt
T 0
which again only depend on the signs of ϕk and ϕa, and is directly related to Proposition 4. Also, we can
see that as nKt or At goes to infinity, we would have
∂ϑctK
∂sw,t
= ϕk or
∂ϑctA
∂sw,t
= ϕa, constant.
Lastly, I turn to the comparative statics of optimal investment shares with respect to return parameters:
∂ϑctK
∂λK
=
∂ 1sk,t
∂λK
ϕk︸ ︷︷ ︸
?
+
∂ϕk
∂λK
1
sk,t︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
and
∂ϑctA
∂λA
=
∂ 1sa,t
∂λA
ϕa︸ ︷︷ ︸
?
+
∂ϕa
∂λA
1
sa,t︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
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which require calibration to sign and see their magnitudes, so do the partials with respect to volatility
parameters ∂ϑ
c
tK
∂σ ,
∂ϑctK
∂σ1
,
∂ϑctK
∂σM
,
∂ϑctA
∂σ ,
∂ϑctA
∂σ1
, and
∂ϑctA
∂σM
. In the following, I want to emphasize the role of σ1,
i.e. the idiosyncratic riskiness of the firm’s risky investment technology.
Conjecture 1. (Impact of Idiosyncratic Risk) I conjecture that as the level of idiosyncratic risk in
firm’s linear technology (σ1) increases, the optimal share of firm capital invested in the risky technology
decreases while the optimal share of personal wealth invested in the market portfolio increases.
In empirical analysis below, I evaluate the impact of idiosyncratic risk by doing comparative statics of
the optimal investment strategy with respect to σ1. Figures 7 and 8 numerically confirm Conjecture
1 by displaying that as σ1 increases, 1). the time-series of optimal weights of firm capital invested in
the linear risky technology uniformly shift downward; 2). the time-series of optimal weights of personal
wealth invested in the market portfolio uniformly shift upward. This is intuitive in the sense that as
the idiosyncratic risk component becomes larger and larger for the firm’s linear technology, the manager
will optimally choose to reduce the investment of firm capital in this risky technology and invest more
in the riskless asset. And as personal wealth can be invested in the aggregate stock market that has no
idiosyncratic risk, the higher Sharpe ratio in this case will induce the manager to optimally invest more
of his personal wealth in the market portfolio and less in the riskless asset, possibly taking on leverage
positions.
5.1 Representative Investor
The representative investor’s preferences are reflected by the state price density in equilibrium. Notice
that in this case the firm under consideration has measure zero compared to the size of the market and
the state price density depends only on the aggregate market dynamics dSMt . Thus, in construction of the
market price of risk, I take dBt = dWt and I can write the loadings on the BM as σ = [σM , σ]. Then, I can
define the market price of risk as ν ≡ λKσ = λAσM , and the Radon-Nikodym derivative as ξt ≡ e−νBt−
t
2
ν2 .
So, the state price density is pit ≡ e−rtξt = e−(r+ ν
2
2
)t−νBt .
Notice that there are still two sources of investment in this case, the aggregate stock market portfolio
and the firm’s linear risky technology, but the two investment opportunities are exposed to the same
Brownian risk and thus admit the same Sharpe ratio. As the representative investor (RI) can invest in
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either source and the firm is so small, he can just invest in the market portfolio (effectively investing in
the firm’s risky technology as well). Thus, the RI’s optimization problem collapses to a standard power
utility (over final wealth) investor’s portfolio choice problem with only one asset - the market portfolio,
with return dSMt = µMdt + σMdWt. Therefore, it is straightforward that the RI’s optimal investment
strategy will be different from that of the manager, who invests in both the market portfolio and the
firm’s risky technology, and will be the myopic rule: ϑRItK =
nθRItKSt
Wt
= 0, ϑRItA =
θRItA S
M
t
Wt
= λA
γσ2M
= µM−r
γσ2M
.
Compared to the manager’s optimal choice, the RI’s optimal investment in the market portfolio does not
depend on the idiosyncratic risk from the firm’s risky technology (σ1) nor on the aggregate risk exposure
of this technology (σ), because now that the firm is so small compared to the market, the idiosyncratic
risk is subsumed and the aggregate risk can be just accounted for by the market exposure.
6 Calibration
To illustrate the model, I calibrate some key parameters to put numbers on the portfolio choice problem. I
obtain daily equity returns data from The Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) from September
2009 through December 2014 for IBM (“the firm”) and the S&P 500 value-weighted index (“the aggregate
stock market”). I also obtain the 3-month Treasury bill from CRSP to use as the risk-free rate. Since
there is no continuous returns data, I use one-day returns as a proxy for dSMt and dSt. To find the drift
and volatility of the aggregate stock market, I simply take the unconditional mean and standard deviation
of the S&P 500 value-weighted index: E (vwretd) = µM and V ar (vwretd) = σ2M , where vwretd is the
daily S&P 500 value-weighted returns. For the firm’s technology, I take the unconditional mean of IBM’s
returns as the drift: E (ret) = µ, where ret is the daily IBM returns. Running a market model of IBM’s
returns on the aggregate market gives me the market beta of IBM, the covariance of IBM’s returns with
the market returns: βIBM =
Cov(dS,dSM)
V ar(dSM )
= σMσ
σ2M
= σσM and σ = βIBMσM . I have σM from earlier and
βIBM can be obtained from the time-series regression: rett = α + βIBMvwretdt + εt. By definition, the
idiosyncratic risk of the firm is uncorrelated with the aggregate risk. The total variance of the linear risky
technology is just the sum of the variance of the part exposed to aggregate risk and the variance of the
idiosyncratic part: V ar (ret) = σ2 + σ21. Thus, σ1 can be obtained as σ1 =
√
V ar (ret)− σ2. For the
risk-free rate, I take the time-series average of the yield on the 3-month T-bills, adjusting them into daily
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returns. The calibrated parameters are as follows:
µ 0.000563 σ 0.0120 σM 0.0164
µM 0.000210 σ1 0.0102 r 0.000000833
Notice that σ, σ1 and σM all have the same magnitude. It should be pointed out that the above calibration
is fine only when IBM has only one project going on, which unlikely holds in reality. Alternatively, I amplify
the idiosyncratic volatility to 5σ1, implicitly assuming that there are 25 independent ongoing R&D projects
in IBM (an assumption for simplicity without much loss of generality). Table 1 below describes all the
parameters that I use in the calibration. Parameters of mean returns and volatilities are obtained from
the above estimation. Following standard literature in dynamic portfolio choice, I set the relative risk
aversion coefficient γ = 10. Unfortunately, I don’t have good enough empirical evidence on the value of
flat wage and thus I set w = 1 as a starting point. Later on, I will show the comparative statics results
as w changes. As for another important parameter n, the number of corporate shares rewarded to the
manager, I will also show results as n changes from 2% to 20%.
Table 1: Parameters
Parameter Choice
T Number of days from Sep 2009 to Dec 2014 1342
µ Mean return of risky technology 0.000563
σ Technology exposure to aggregate risk 0.0120
σ1 Technology exposure to idiosyncratic risk 0.0510
µM Mean return of market portfolio 0.000210
σM Aggregate stock market volatility 0.0164
r Risk-free rate 0.000000833
γ Risk aversion coefficient 10
w Flat wage 1
A0 Personal initial wealth 1
K0 Initial firm capital 5
n Shares paid to the manager 2%
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7 Empirical Predictions
In this section, I briefly discuss some empirical predictions that can be made based on the main theoretical
results from Section 5. From Proposition 2, if the manager is at the beginning of his tenure and has not yet
accumulated much personal wealth, then the compensation from the firm’s capital will be a large part of the
manager’s overall budget constraint. Then, investment in the firm’s risky technology will be less volatile
compared to a similar firm yet managed by a senior manager who has already accumulated a large amount
of personal wealth compared to the firm’s capital. In other words, similar firms’ investments in similar
projects should look different for managers with differential personal wealth. In an ideal empirical setting,
we would have two identical firms with identical risky projects and total capital, and two managers with
different personal wealth levels. We would expect to see the firm that has manager with the higher wealth
level invest in a more consistent manner in the risky project, compared to the firm that has manager with
the lower wealth level. For the manager with larger personal wealth, we should see his personal portfolio
have a more constant share in the aggregate stock market than the manager with smaller personal wealth.
Next, from Proposition 3, we should see a manager rebalancing his portfolio. Specifically, if the firm’s
risky technology has a period of sufficiently high returns relative to the aggregate stock market, so that
the fraction of total personal wealth invested in this risky technology has gone up, we should see the
manager sell some shares in the firm’s risky technology and buy more shares in the aggregate stock
market. Similarly, if the aggregate market return goes up sufficient high relatively to the return on the
risky technology, so that the fraction invested in the aggregate stock market goes up, we should see the
manager sell some shares of the aggregate stock market and invest more in the firm’s risky technology.
We can easily test this if we could see the portfolio holdings of the manager in practice. Finally, from
Proposition 4, we should see differential effects on two very similar firms with similar managers, who yet
get paid different flat wages. In an ideal empirical setting, we would have two almost identical firms with
managers who have similar levels of wealth, but one firm pays its manager a higher flat wage compared
to the other. In that case, the manager who gets paid a higher flat wage would invest more in both the
risky technology of his firm and the aggregate stock market.
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8 Conclusion
In this paper, I set out to explore the question of optimal investment behavior of a firm’s manager in
the scenario where he is investing both for the firm and for himself, and he derives utility from his final
wealth that comes from three sources: executive compensation in the form of the firm’s capital shares,
return from private investment, and a terminal flat wage. First, I have shown that the allocation is the
same regardless of whether the manager is prohibited from trading the public shares of his own firm
or not. In the non-negligible presence of such individual firm that the manager is attached to, he will
optimally deviate from a representative investor even in a complete markets setting. I have also shown
that there will be important effects such as relative-wealth rebalancing and labor income hedging, which
illustrate the empirical importance of both the executive compensation scheme and the flat wage structure
on incentivizing the manager to carry out first-best investment strategies for the firm. Specifically, more
stock compensation discourages the manager from investing in the firm’s risky technology, but encourages
more risk-taking in terms of his private investment in the aggregate stock market. In addition, flag wage,
effectively as a risk-free bond, hedges against inter-temporal risk and leads to more risk-taking behavior
both in firm investment and private investment. It is important to notice that the idiosyncratic risk
component σ1 in the firm’s risky technology plays a significant role in affecting the optimal investment
strategy. Results from calibration show that the manager invests less in the firm’s risky technology and
more in the aggregate stock market as the risk of firm R&D increases. The larger is such individual risk, the
more we expect the manager to allocate his personal wealth to the aggregate stock market and the less we
expect him to allocate the firm’s capital to the risky technology. All these findings above are important for
empirical evaluation and incentive provision for firms in consideration of executive compensation structure.
More research can be done in this line of inquiry such as to perform cross-section analysis with different
return structures from various firms to gauge relative significance of the effects shown in this paper with
different firm characteristics. Also, it might be useful to delve deeper into the R&D structure of firms
to more accurately measure returns on projects to be used in the risky technology investment, which
otherwise would be less convincing since we were implicitly restricting the firms’ properties and types of
business when we used the equity returns as a proxy for the risky technology investment.
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Appendix A. Derivations and Proofs
A1. Solution of Problem (8)
Proof. I use the Radon-Nikodym derivative ξ, defined as ξt ≡ e−ν′Bt− t2ν′υ, to change measures from risk-
natural to risk-neutral, where Bt and ν are as defined before. Treating At + nKt as a whole, the dynamic
budget constraints (9) and (10) can be manipulated into the following equivalent static budget constraint:
EQ
[
e−rT (AT + nKT )
] ≤ A0 + nK0 (18)
where Q denotes the expectation under the risk-neutral measure, with the state-price density defined as
pit ≡ e−rtξt = e−(r+ ν
′ν
2
)t−ν′Bt . Then, (8) can be transformed into the following problem:
sup
AT+nKT
EQ
[
(AT + nKT )
1−γ
1− γ − κpiT (AT + nKT )
]
(19)
where κ ≡
(
1
A0+nK0
EQ
[
pi
γ−1
γ
T
])γ
. Again, treating AT + nKT as a whole, the FOC is
(AT + nKT )
−γ = κpiT  AT + nKT = (κpiT )− 1γ (20)
Given the form of pit, we have
EQ
[
pi
γ−1
γ
T
]
= e
− γ−1
γ
(r+ 1
2γ
ν′ν)T
κ =
(
1
A0 + nK0
e
− γ−1
γ
(r+ 1
2γ
ν′ν)T
)γ
AT + nKT = (A0 + nK0) e
rT+ 1
γ
ν′νT− 1
2γ2
ν′νT+ 1
γ
ν′BT
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Finally, equate the deflated wealths derived in two ways, where the “hats” correspond to the expectations
under the risk-neutral measure Q:
Wˆt = A0 + nK0 +
ˆ t
0
θouAdSˆ
M
u + nθ
o
uKdSˆu
Wˆt = A0 + nK0 +
ˆ t
0
1
γ
WˆudBˆu
and solve the equation, we have the optimal portfolio weights for the manager:
ϑ ≡
 ϑotA
ϑotK
 = 1
γ
(σσ′)−1λ =
1
γ
 (σ2+σ21)λA−σMσλKσ2Mσ21−σMσλA+σ2MλK
σ2Mσ
2
1
 .
A2. Solution of Problem (15)
Proof. The FOC’s of (15) with respect to ϑctA and ϑ
c
tK are:
[ϑctA] :JAAtλA + JAAA
2
tϑ
c
tAσ
2
M + JAKAtKtϑ
c
tKσMσ = 0 (21)
[ϑctK ] :JKKtλK + JKKK
2
t ϑ
c
tK
(
σ2 + σ21
)
+ JAKAtKtϑ
c
tAσMσ = 0 (22)
Conjecture:
J (At,Kt, t) = g (t)
(
At + we
−r(T−t) + nKt
)1−γ
1− γ
Then, (21) and (22) can be simplified into the following linear equations:
 γAtσ2Mσ γnKt (σ2 + σ21)
γAtσ
2
1σ γnKtσMσ
2

 ϑctA
ϑctK
 =
 (At + we−r(T−t) + nKt)λAσ(
At + we
−r(T−t) + nKt
)
λKσM

which leads to the following optimal portfolio weights:
 ϑctA
ϑctK
 =
 At+we−r(T−t)+nKtγAt
(
λA(σ2+σ21)
σ21σ
2
M
− λK
σ21
σ
σM
)
At+we−r(T−t)+nKt
γnKt
(
λK
σ21
− λA
σ21
σ
σM
)
 .
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Next, I complete the solution by obtaining the value function. Imposing the Bellman equation (15) gives:
g
′
(t)
1− γ + g (t)
[
r +
1
2
λK
λKσM − λAσ
γσσ21
+
1
2
λA
1
γσ2M
(
λA
σ2 + σ21
σ21
− λK σMσ
σ21
)]
= 0→ g′ (t) = −qg(t)
where
q ≡ (1− γ)
[
r +
1
2
λK
λKσM − λAσ
γσσ21
+
1
2
λA
1
γσ2M
(
λA
σ2 + σ21
σ21
− λK σMσ
σ21
)]
.
Then, solving for g (t) with the boundary condition that g (T ) = 1, we have:
g (t) = eq(T−t)
which yields the value function:
J (At,Kt, t) = e
q(T−t)
(
At + we
−r(T−t) + nKt
)1−γ
1− γ . (23)
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Appendix B. Figures
Figure 1: Fraction of Firm Capital in Linear Risky Technology-Benchmark
Figure2: Fraction of Personal Wealth in Aggregate Stock Market-Benchmark
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Figure 3: Fraction of Firm Capital in Linear Risky Technology-Comparative Statics with n
Figure 4: Fraction of Personal Wealth in Stock Market-Comparative Statics with n
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Figure 5: Fraction of Firm Capital in Linear Risky Technology-Comparative Statics with w
Figure 6: Fraction of Personal Wealth in Stock Market-Comparative Statics with w
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Figure 7: Fraction of Firm Capital in Linear Risky Technology-Comparative Statics with σ1
Figure 8: Fraction of Personal Wealth in Stock Market-Comparative Statics with σ1
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